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GIVE ME A ©: 
Refashioning the Supreme Court’s Decision in 
Star Athletica v. Varsity Into an Art-First Approach 
to Copyright Protection for Fashion Designers
Jared Schroeder, Ph.D.* 
Camille Kraeplin, Ph.D.**
Abstract
Fashion designers have struggled to establish their works as expressions 
that qualify for copyright protection.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
March 2017 in Star Athletica v. Varsity was less of a victory for fashion designers 
than it might appear.  The Court’s effort to clarify and apply the “separabil-
ity test” stopped short of providing the clarity needed to protect the works of 
fashion designers.  This Article contends that this confusion can be resolved by 
conceptualizing fashion designs as forms of art that are often applied to useful 
objects, rather understanding them as useful items that, if their designs can be 
conceptually separated from the object, can receive protections.
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Introduction
Fashion designers are generally recognized as artists who produce creative 
works.  However, they differ from most other artists in one crucial way: Their 
creations are almost always utilitarian.  Fashion designers’ works typically take 
the form of clothing and other wearable items, which make them different than 
more traditional forms of artistic expression, such as painted artwork on canvas, 
written material in books, or recorded music.  Crucially, canvases and books are 
not considered utility items.  Other than propping open a door or a window, 
books, for example, have seldom been understood as anything more than recep-
tacles for the creations of authors.  Clothing and accessories, however, are used 
as and are commonly categorized as functional items.1  Quite problematically 
when it comes to copyright law, clothing and accessories can be both utility items, 
performing the task of covering the body and protecting it from the environ-
ment, and media through which fashion designers express their art.  The courts 
have struggled to consistently separate this dual nature of fashion as both art and 
useful item in their interpretation of United States copyright law.  The Copyright 
Act outlines that “useful articles” can be protected only if “such design incorpo-
rates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately 
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the 
article.”2  The designs of utility items—such as spoons and tabletop tea lighters, 
for example—are not considered copyrightable under the law because they are 
categorized as useful items.3  Traditional artistic creations such as songs, novels, 
and paintings lack a clearly utilitarian element and have generally been wholly 
accepted as protected under the Copyright Act.
Thus, copyright law splits works into either purely artistic creations or 
items that are both useful and artistic, ultimately creating different standards 
of evaluation for each.  Fashion designers, because of the useful nature of their 
1 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 202 (1954); Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. 1002, 
1007 (2017); see also Samson Vermont, The Dubious Legal Rationale for Denying 
Copyright to Fashion, 21 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 89, 91–92 (2013); Aya Eguchi, Curtailing 
Copycat Couture: The Merits of the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention 
Act and a Licensing Scheme for the Fashion Industry, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 131, 139–140 
(2011).
2 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
3 Bonazoli v. R.S.V.P. Int’l, 353 F. Supp. 2d 218 (D.R.I. 2005); Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Yankee 
Candle Co., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1119 (C.D. Ill. 2012).
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creations, have struggled to establish their works as among the types of expres-
sion that “deserve rewards commensurate with services rendered” within 
copyright law, as Justice Reed reasoned in his opinion for the Court in Mazer v. 
Stein in 1954.4  In other words, their works have often left them with one foot in 
each of the two copyright-related groups—purely artistic expression and useful 
items with artistic elements.  Scholars have devoted extensive attention to the 
question of whether fashion is a form of art, something that is more akin to a 
musical composition or painting than to a table or chair.5  While their conclu-
sions have not led to a consistent answer, the idea that works of fashion can be 
understood as works of art that are applied to useful articles provides a poten-
tial lens through which the labors of designers can be understood.  In practice, 
however, the protections that are traditionally associated with fashion designs 
have ended up somewhere between the front-and-center sales display and the 
clearance rack in the back of the store.  They remain unclear, even after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Star Athletica v. Varsity in 2017.  The case, which 
involved a massive cheerleading uniform designer and retailer that claimed 
a rival company had stolen its designs, represented the first time the Court 
specifically addressed the rights of fashion designers to copyright their works. 
The rival company, Star Athletica, contended cheerleading uniforms are useful 
items, and therefore Varsity’s designs cannot be protected by copyright.6  The 
Court sided with Varsity, finding the designer’s works to be copyrightable.  The 
ruling, however, was less of a victory for designers than it appears.
Justices from the outset recognized that the line between useful works 
and art “is often difficult to draw.”7  Justice Thomas, who wrote the Court’s 
opinion, explained that the justices took up the appeal from the Sixth Circuit 
to “resolve widespread disagreement over the proper test for implementing 
§ 101’s separate identification and independent-existence requirements.”8  Jus-
tice Thomas was referring to the “separability test,” which was devised in the 
1950s as part of  a case that involved a dancing figure that was part of a lamp-
stand.  The test was ultimately integrated into the Copyright Act of 1976.9  The 
two-part separability standard that the Court used in Star Athletica first asks 
whether a part of a useful item can be understood as a two- or three-dimen-
sional piece of art when it is separated from the useful item.10  The second 
4 Mazer, 374 U.S. at 219; see also Eguchi, supra note 1, at 136–40; Lynsey Blackmon, The 
Devil Wears Prado: A Look at the Design Piracy Prohibition Act and the Extension of 
Protection to the World of Fashion, 35 Pepp. L. Rev. 107, 127–31 (2007).
5 Valerie Steele, Fashion, in Fashion and Art 13, 23–25 (Adam Geczy & Vicki Karaminas 
eds., 2012); Sung Bok Kim, Is Fashion Art? 2 Fashion Theory 51, 53–55 (1998); Sanda 
Miller, Fashion as Art; Is Fashion Art? 11 Fashion Theory 25, 26–28 (2015).
6 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1008. 
7 Id. at 1007.
8 Id.
9 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 201.
10 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007.
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step in the test considers whether the object would qualify as a “protectable 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—either on its own or fixed in some other 
tangible medium of expression—if it were imagined separately from the useful 
article.”11  The Court concluded that Varsity’s cheerleading designs met that 
standard because the designs, a series of chevrons, stripes, and other shapes, 
could be removed from the garment and affixed to another form of media, such 
as a painter’s canvas.  The Court’s reasoning, however, does little to resolve the 
persistent questions regarding copyright protections for the works of fashion 
designers, who are part of a $1.75-trillion global fashion industry that includes 
nearly $370 billion in the United States.12  At best, it provides the precedent 
that some elements of some designs can be protected.13
This Article explores the relationship between copyright law and fash-
ion design.  It first examines the definition of fashion and its role in culture, 
society, and business before analyzing the Court’s majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions from Star Athletica.  The Article then considers other rel-
evant fashion-related intellectual property cases as well as copyright law, its 
roots, the fashion industry’s unsuccessful efforts to encourage lawmakers to 
include fashion-specific protections within federal law, and relevant precedents 
regarding protections for original works.  Ultimately, the Article proposes an 
alternative approach to how the courts can conceptualize copyright protec-
tions for fashion designs, one that remains relatively closely aligned with the 
Court’s opinion in Star Athletica and with traditional interpretations of federal 
law while at the same time providing simplicity and clarity to an area of cre-
ative expression that has, thus far, received little protection.
I. Fashion as Art and Business
The fashion industry is a trillion-dollar global business that first emerged 
as a powerful force during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.14  It was not 
until the nineteenth century, however, when English designer Charles Freder-
ick Worth set up his own fashion house in Paris that the designer-dominated 
fashion system we know today was born.15  His was the first true designer 
11 Id.
12 Id. at 1011–12; Joint Staff of J. Econ. Comm., 114th Cong., The Economic Impact of 
the Fashion Industry (Comm. Print 2015).
13 Steff Yotka, What the Supreme Court’s First Ruling on Fashion Copyright Means 
for the Runway, Vogue (Mar. 23, 2017, 01:42 PM), http://www.vogue.com/article/su-
preme-court-star-athletica-varsity-brands-ruling-fashion-industry [https://perma.cc/
HC8B-JSZY]; Supreme Court Sounds Off on Copyright in Cheerleading Uniform, The 
Fashion Law  (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/supreme-court-says-
cheerleader-uniform-is-protectable-by-copyright-law [https://perma.cc/5Q34-G3TN].
14 Frédéric Godart, Unveiling Fashion: Business, Culture, and Identity in the Most 
Glamorous Industry 15 (2012).
15   Phyllis G. Tortora & Keith Eubank, Survey of Historic Costume 354 (2010).
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atelier.16  After the wife of Napoleon III, Empress Eugénie, became a client, 
Worth’s business flourished.  He was the first to show clothes on live models 
and the first to present a new collection every year.  Worth’s gowns were cus-
tomized to each client, and, like a true artist, he even signed his work.  Late 
in the nineteenth century, Worth formed the Chambre Syndicale de la Cou-
ture, the precursor to the organization the group that today stages the couture 
shows in Paris every season.17  These shows continue to highlight the meticu-
lous work of some of fashion’s most expert craftspeople.18
For decades, the high-fashion industry followed what is often referred 
to as the “craft” business model, where one designer oversaw the labor-inten-
sive process from creation to manufacturing for made-to-order clothing.  For 
years, the structure of the fashion industry remained relatively consistent fol-
lowing this craft model.  Yet there is an inherent tension in this model.  Beyond 
the typical schedule of fashion, which requires releasing new collections for 
each season, there is an intrinsic need for balance between artistic and mone-
tary demands.  Designers with strong business perspectives are not necessarily 
more successful: at times, the business side can stifle the originality that a label 
is known for in an attempt to make money.  The key to a brand’s success is 
managing both innovation and business awareness in order to form survival 
strategies.19
In the twentieth century, designers realized that other models might serve 
them better than the traditional craft model.  One researcher contended that 
different organizational methods coevolved in France, Italy, and the United 
States.  France developed the “umbrella holding” company, Italy developed 
the “flexible embedded network,” and the United States developed the “vir-
tual organization” model.20
France’s “umbrella holding” model, which developed after World War II, 
consisted of a large haute couture house diversifying its product—venturing 
into perfumes, cosmetics, accessories, and most importantly, into ready-to-wear 
lines of clothing for men, women, and sometimes children.  Each product line 
varied and functioned relatively autonomously.  Many companies, among them 
16  Jessa Krick, Charles Frederick Worth (1825–1895) and the House of Worth, in Heil-
brunn Timeline of Art History (Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2004), https://www.
metmuseum.org/toah/hd/wrth/hd_wrth.htm.
17 The House of Worth, Vogue (Sep. 18, 2010), https://www.vogue.co.uk/shows/spring-sum-
mer-2011-ready-to-wear/house-of-worth; Mary Lynn Stewart, Copying and Copyright-
ing Haute Couture: Democratizing Fashion, 1900–1930s, 28 French Historical Studies 
103, 109 (2005).
18 Id.
19 Wendy Malem, Fashion Designers as Business: London, 12 J. Fashion Marketing & 
Mgmt. 398, 412 (2008).
20 Marie-Laure Djelic & Antti Ainamo, The Coevolution of New Organizational Forms 
in the Fashion Industry: A Historical and Comparative Study of France, Italy, and the 
United States, 10 Org. Sci. 622, 625–26 (1999).
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Christian Dior and Yves Saint Laurent, began to subcontract work for sub-
sidiary lines.21
In the 1970s and 1980s, the industrial aspect of the business changed 
dramatically, creating the “flexible embedded network,” a model first recog-
nized in Italy.22  A young Marco Rivetti, a renowned Italian designer, started 
to involve designers from his company at the product-planning stage, chang-
ing the way industrial work was conceived in the process.  His company set up 
a huge assembly line-style factory and set a new precedent by hiring work-
ers with tailoring experience.  Rivetti recognized the need for better tailoring 
expertise at the product-planning and assembly stages as demand for his manu-
facturing services grew.23  At the time, designers’ creations couldn’t easily make 
it into the market through time-honored production methods established in 
the atelier, where garments were constructed largely by hand.  Overhead was 
simply too high.  This level of craftsmanship was reserved for haute couture 
garments, produced by a select few brands.  In contrast, the vast majority of 
designers began to produce their clothing lines through licensing agreements 
with manufacturers.24  
This provided designers with industrial abilities so their commodities 
could be produced on a large scale, and gave them additional financial resourc-
es.25  As one researcher summarized it, this model functions as “a combination 
of coherent brand management with high-quality manufacturing, subcon-
tracted to a tight network of regular partners.”26
The American “virtual organization” model functions as the opposite of 
the French.  While French haute couture brands such as Christian Dior and 
Chanel had to “downgrade” their pieces to produce ready-to-wear clothing, 
American brands like Ralph Lauren and Calvin Klein have “upgraded” their 
works over the years.27  The United States’ sheer size and purchasing power 
easily gave way to assembly-line production.  However, few steps of the design 
production process have remained in-house beyond strategic decisionmaking. 
The company remains responsible for designing “the brand,” but most every-
thing else is subcontracted out.28
All of these models came into being within the past century, as fashion 
grew into a multitrillion-dollar international business.  Today the fashion indus-
try has evolved far beyond the small craftsman-like workshops that produced 
21 Id. at 628–29.
22 Id. at 630.
23 Elisabetta Merlo, Italian Fashion Business: Achievements and Challenges (1970s–2000s), 
53 Bus. History 344, 345–60 (2011).
24 Id.; Djelic & Ainamo, supra note 20, at 632.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 632.
28 Id. at 633.
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luxury goods for the courts of preindustrial Europe and gave birth to such 
legendary brands as Louis Vuitton and Gucci.  Driven in large part by chang-
ing market forces, including globalization and new technologies, fashion has 
become an integral part of contemporary consumer culture.  Fashion designers 
now create clothes not only for haute couture, but also for mass production. 
Elite and mass fashions still differ significantly in terms of the quality of fabrics 
and levels of designers and tailors, as well as accessories and price.  However, 
such global names as Armani, Prada, and Chanel dictate global fashion trends 
at both the high and low ends.  Thus, clothing designers play a crucial role not 
only in creating haute couture, but in influencing the mass production of cloth-
ing, leading to economic growth.29
As with many other industries, the evolution of the Internet made fash-
ion truly global.  The speed of the industry has increased, fueled by a constant 
desire for “the next big thing.”  Where cities like New York and Paris were 
once fashion meccas, exclusively defining what is or is not “fashionable,” those 
living in smaller cities now have access to the same styles online.  In addition, 
while designs from high-end labels once took months to make their way from 
the runway to the racks of a storefront, now fast-fashion knockoffs can be in 
stores almost immediately—sometimes before the original designs themselves. 
Fast-fashion brands have managed to take designs and reproduce them rapidly, 
shipping them out to stores within days or weeks.  With such a large market at 
stake, those wishing to get a piece of the pie have jumped in—copycats.
A. The Fast-Fashion Industry, Counterfeits, and Copycats
Copying in fashion can range from deliberate copying, illegally coun-
terfeiting trademarked logos, imitating runway garments for mainstream 
customers, or simply producing unintentional similarities from following pop-
ular trends.30  With the increased speed and production of the fashion industry, 
the ease of copying and counterfeiting has increased as well.
Many designers have sought legal protection against rip-offs of their work 
in the form of patents, trademarks, and copyrights.31  Despite existing protec-
tions, many designers say that they are not enough or are not easily attainable. 
Even with legal protections, knockoffs are rampant because these activities 
are extremely profitable.  The profit comes at a cost for the designers, how-
ever.  Each year, U.S. brands lose an estimated $250 billion when consumers 
purchase counterfeit goods instead of legitimate products.32  These counterfeit 
29 Mindaugas Laužikas & Rasa Mokšeckienė, The Symbiosis of Art and Business in the 
Fashion Design Industry, 7 Intell. Econ. 101, 110 (2013).
30 V. Ann Paulins & Jule L. Hillery, Ethics in the Fashion Industry 94–95 (2009).
31 Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051; see also Leslie Davis Burns, Kathy K. Mullet 
& Nancy O. Bryant, The Business of Fashion: Designing, Manufacturing, and Mar-
keting 57–62 (5th ed. 2016).
32 Paulins & Hillery, supra note 30, at 91.
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goods do not benefit the country’s economy and damage the legitimate brand’s 
reputation by providing shoddy work.33
Some designers, especially smaller designers who cannot afford legal 
protections or court fees, have turned to social media to combat copycats.  In 
March 2017, Spanish brand M2Malletier shared images on Instagram of CH by 
Carolina Herrera handbags, alleging that the bags copied M2Malletier’s “sig-
nature” handles.34  Designer Aurora James of Brother Vellies has frequently 
called out popular lower-price point brands like Zara, Steve Madden, and Jef-
frey Campbell for copying her designs.35  Following James’s public complaint 
against Steve Madden, the offending brand’s shoes were pulled off its website 
the next day.  These smaller brands lack not only the finances but also the time 
and capacity to take on larger companies that hijack their designs.  While some 
designers have lobbied for greater legal protections, others believe their best 
defense is the sort of public shaming applied in the Madden case.36
B. More Than a Piece of Clothing
Beyond the concept of fashion as an “industry,” fashion has functioned 
in the lives of individuals and societies as a form of art, of identity, and of 
value—fashion is more than a piece of clothing.  Over the past few centuries, 
clothing has evolved from a purely utilitarian product to a form of applied art. 
When clothes were something used simply to cover the body and keep it warm, 
“fashion” was a craft.  Today, however, the public seems to agree that fash-
ion is a form of creative expression, a form of “wearable art.”37  According to 
 Brussels-based intellectual property attorney Eveline Van Keymeuler, “Fash-
ion designers are artists and the medium they work in is clothing.”38
For the purposes of this Article, clothing is defined as a general gar-
ment, such as a plain white T-shirt.  These garments serve the basic function of 
protecting people from the environment and providing a sense of modesty.39 
Fashion goes beyond the basic utilitarian function of clothing to convey certain 
33 Id. at 93–94.
34 Chantal Fernandez, Designers Take Copyright Infringement into Their Own Hands, 
Bus. of Fashion (June 28, 2017), https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/news- 
analysis/designers-take-copyright-infringement-into-their-own-hands [https://perma.cc/
PZQ7-JGYQ].
35 Ana Colon, Brother Vellies’ Aurora James on Her Sandals Getting Ripped Off . . . Again, 
REFINERY 29 (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.refinery29.com/2017/01/136147/brother- 
vellies-steve-madden-sandals-knock-off [https://perma.cc/QG38-F2UA].
36 Fernandez, supra note 34; Lisa J. Hedrick, Tearing Fashion Design Protection Apart at 
the Seams, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 215, 233–39 (2008).
37 Eveline Van Keymeulen, Copyrighting Couture or Counterfeit Chic?  Protecting Fashion 
Design: A Comparative EU-US Perspective, 7 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Prac. 728, 728 (2012).
38 Id.
39 Tortora & Eubank, supra note 15, at 1; Clothing, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 
(Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/clothing [https://perma.
cc/2R9G-87EJ].
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ideas, statuses, and customs.  Fashion is a trend, recognized and adopted 
by a group of people for a limited amount of time.40  These fashion trends 
reflect designers’ original intellectual conceptions.  Fashion, unlike clothing, 
is acquired out of desire rather than necessity.  Despite this simple explana-
tion, the distinction itself “lends conflict to the purpose of apparel and the role 
of design innovation presented through clothing.”41  While individuals choose 
different styles for different reasons, ultimately fashion is chosen because the 
wearer gives the garment in question value.  That value could be of a personal, 
cultural, or religious nature.
One group of scholars contended that fashion should be categorized as 
being a part of “creative industry.”42  A creative industry can include popular 
music or media, though the performing or fine arts are generally not included. 
A creative industry is defined “in terms of a class of economic choice theory 
in which the predominant fact is that because of inherent novelty and uncer-
tainty, decisions both to produce and to consume are determined by the choice 
of others in a social network.”43  Creative industries rely largely on influence 
from this social network, with individuals prioritizing outside influence over 
other signals like price points and individual preferences, because these net-
works of influence provide informational feedback.  Based on economist Jason 
Potts’s definition, fashion as a creative industry gives preference to others’ 
choices—because of the inherent novelty and uncertainty of fashion, choices 
made by others provide information and context.44  In simplified terms, this 
means that individuals do not decide what is “fashionable” the same way they 
do not decide what is “good art.”  Instead, the leading social group—in this 
case the web of fashion designers, editors, stylists, and other insiders—makes 
these decisions for the individual.45
Creative industries represent the intersection of art, culture, business, 
and technologies that together fuel the cycle of creativity.  Engineering, archi-
tecture, design, art, and music are those areas where the birth of new ideas 
and technologies occurs.  Creative design is expressed as decorative, luxuri-
ous, and unique works, such as fashion, jewelry, architecture, interiors, etc.  In 
40 Tortora & Eubank, supra note 15, at 8–9; Sandra Keiser, Deborah Vandermar & Myr-
na B. Garner, Beyond Design: The Synergy of Apparel Product Development 83 
(4th ed. 2017); “Fashion, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (Dec. 7, 2017), https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fashion [https://perma.cc/KJT8-UFCU].
41 Paulins & Hillery, supra note 30, at 78.
42 Jason Potts, Stuart Cunningham, John Hartley & Paul Ormerod, Social Network Mar-
kets: A New Definition of the Creative Industries, 32 J. Cultural Econ. 167, 168–69 
(2008).
43 Id. at 169.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 169–70.
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many countries, a nation’s cultural heritage is represented in its creative design, 
including its clothing design.46
C. Fashion and Art
In some cases, fashion serves a purpose that extends far beyond wear-
ability.  For example, Canadian artist Jana Sterbak created her now seminal 
Vanitas: Flesh Dress for an Albino Anorectic in 1987.47  The piece was composed, 
or rather decomposed, of rotting meat sewn into a dress, modeled against the 
artist’s naked flesh.  While not a piece for the squeamish, it certainly held value 
as art, filled with the artist’s feminist anger regarding women’s treatment as 
“hunks of flesh.”48  As philosopher Theodor Adorno wrote in his Aesthetic 
Theory, “great artists since Baudelaire have conspired with fashion.”49  Yves 
Saint Laurent’s Mondrian dress turned high art into wearable art, redefining 
the original modern painting by Piet Mondrian as a separate, independent, and 
thus derivative work that incorporates major copyright-protected elements of 
an original piece.50  The A-line shift featuring Mondrian’s graphic lines, white 
spaces, and primary colors was released in the fall of 1965 and became an 
iconic symbol of the decade.51  This context removes fashion from its industrial 
connotations and gives it a new value as a commodity with the same sensibil-
ities as art.”52  Although the work of Dutch designer Iris van Herpen can be 
worn—and has been, by high-profile women at red-carpet events—her intel-
lectually complex designs were initially meant to be examined.  The exhibit 
Iris van Herpen: Transforming Fashion, which includes forty-five pieces of her 
fashion designs, has made stops at major American museums in recent years.53 
The complex designs, including an intricately printed dress that takes on the 
46 Laužikas & Mokšeckienė, supra note 29, at 109.
47 Jennifer McLerran, Disciplined Subjects and Docile Bodies in the Work of Contempo-
rary Artist Jana Sterbak, 24 Feminist Stud. 535, 537 (1998).
48 Fashion and Art, supra note 5, at 1.
49 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 192 (Gretel Adorno & Olf Fiedemann, eds., 
Robert Hullot-Kentor, trans., Continuum 1997).
50 Nancy J. Troy, Mondrian’s Dress: Yves Saint Laurent, Copying (and) the Couture Copy, 
63 Bulletin of the German Historical Institute 27, 27–30 (2018).  Yves Saint Lau-
rent’s use of a recognizable and recognized piece of high art in a dress design contrib-
uted to the phenomenon of fashion representing ideas and aesthetics more than simply 
functioning as utilitarian garments.
51 Id. at 45. 
52 Kim, supra note 5, at 57.
53 Iris van Herpen: Transforming Fashion, Carnegie Museum of Art (last visited Mar. 8, 
2019), https://cmoa.org/exhibition/iris-van-herpen [https://perma.cc/B33E-NE3M]; Iris 
van Herpen: Transforming Fashion, Dallas Museum of Art (last visited Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://www.dma.org/art/exhibitions/iris-van-herpen-transforming-fashion [https:// perma.
cc/BX9J-Y5LZ]; Iris van Herpen: Transforming Fashion, Cincinnati Art Museum (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.cincinnatiartmuseum.org/transformingfashion [https://
perma.cc/84VT-LXUU].
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appearance of a skeleton and a dress that creates the illusion of water splashing 
off the wearer, elevate fashion.  They are meant to inspire and to contemplate. 
As noted above, van Herpen’s pieces can be worn, and they have been.  How-
ever, more than most couture clothing, the esoteric nature of a gown designed 
to resemble a skeleton begs the question: How truly functional is it?
Despite the lack of wearable utility of these pieces, some artists argue 
that functional fashion serves an artistic and valuable purpose.  As art histo-
rian Anne Hollander contended in Seeing Through Clothes, “dress is a form 
of visual art, a creation of images with the visible self as its medium.”54  Like 
the Yves Saint Laurent Mondrian dress, patterns, designs, and accessories can 
be artistic—creating an ideal image of the wearer in the process.  This ideal 
image projects how the wearer perceives herself and wishes to present herself 
to the world.  In turn, one could argue that the fashion that enables this cre-
ative self-expression should be copyrightable, much like creative genius in any 
other artistic endeavor.
D. Fashion and Identity
Fashion is intrinsically tied to the concept of portraying an individual’s 
“identity signals,” indicating social affiliations, likes, dislikes, and cues.55  Fash-
ion forms a central element in providing these identity signals about the wearer, 
along with other signals such as culinary habits, travel destinations, and educa-
tion levels.56  Some choose fashion to portray their individuality or distinction 
from others.  Notably, according to the Simmelian theory of fashion, fashion 
is used as a social tool to distinguish the upper class from the lower classes.57 
When the upper class adopts a particular style, the lower classes rapidly imitate 
the style in an attempt to match the prestige of the upper class.  This pushes 
members of the upper class to shift away from said style to a new one to distin-
guish themselves from the lower classes.  The result is a never-ending cycle of 
social class-driven fashion.
Economist Adam Smith argued that the desire for the lower classes to 
imitate is out of a natural desire, a need to imitate the rich to participate in their 
perceived happiness.58  Several studies have found that the purchase of luxury 
brands can elicit an emotional response from the consumer, like pleasure or 
excitement.59  Select individuals reject this notion as a form of protest against 
the bourgeoisie and instead adopt “oppositional fashion.”60  This anti-fashion 
54 Anne Hollander, Seeing Through Clothes 311 (1993).
55 Godart, supra note 14, at 19.
56 Id. at 20.
57 Id. at 23.
58 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 3–5 (1853).
59 Franck Vigneron & Lester W. Johnson, Measuring Brand Luxury Perceptions, 11 J. 
Brand Mgmt., 484, 484–508 (2004).
60 llona Mikkonen, Handan Vicdan & Annu Markkula, What Not to Wear?  Oppositional 
Ideology, Fashion, & Governmentality in Wardrobe Self-Help, 17 Consumption, Mkt., & 
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stance takes the current trend or fashion and inverts it—akin to the goth or 
punk subcultural attitudes.  However, this counterculture is limited, as sociol-
ogist Fred Davis points out: Oppositional fashion is entirely dependent on its 
definition as reactionary.  In essence, oppositional fashion is solely a secondary 
effect of fashion itself.61
Even with subcultures, a concept of “fitting in” still exists, whether by 
having a certain hairstyle or wearing certain clothes in order to reflect atti-
tudes or identities.  For example, goths call non-goths “trendies” to reflect the 
group’s distaste for conformity.  Reflexively, the concept of a “fashion victim” 
exists: those who attempt to follow mainstream fashion, and yet fall short.  An 
essential trait follows fashion victims: excess.  A sense of hubris is attached 
to the fashion victim, who piles on trend after trend until collectively, his or 
her appearance is out of fashion.  The fashion victim is unaware of this and 
continues to think he or she is in vogue.  Whether an individual is part of an 
anti-fashion subculture or a fashion victim following the trends, both these 
groups are important from an economic and ideological perspective.62
While some subcultures have developed out of a desire to counter popu-
lar culture, others exist outside of Western popular culture.  For example, hijabi 
culture within the Muslim community, while culturally developed in the Middle 
East, exists as an “other” in much of Western society and culture.  Islamic dress 
code calls on women to dress “modestly,” often resulting in dress that covers 
the head.  This stands in opposition to modern Western fashion, which often 
rewards women who dress provocatively.  However, the idea that women can 
follow religious dress codes and be fashionable under Western standards is a 
concept that has emerged in recent years.  These women have been dubbed 
“hijabistas”—a portmanteau of the words hijab and fashionista.  Following the 
advent of the Internet, these communities have developed exclusively in a dig-
ital context.  Many of these hijabistas have avid followings online, forming a 
space where faith and fashion co-exist as part of the “Islamic culture industry.”63
Broadly, fashion occupies a uniquely impactful position in society. 
Decisions that relate to fashion design carry with them certain amounts of 
economic, personal identity, and cultural weight.  Such widespread influence, 
which ranges far beyond simple utility, provides important perspectives when 
considering the conditions under which fashion or clothing items can be pro-
tected by copyright.
Culture 254, 256–57 (2013).
61 Godart, supra note 14, at 28.
62 Bjørn Schiermer, Fashion Victims: On the Individualizing and De-individualizing Pow-
ers of Fashion, 14 J. Dress, Body & Culture 83 (2010).
63 Elif Kavakci & Camille R. Kraeplin, Religious Beings in Fashionable Bodies: The Online 
Identity Construction of Hijabi Social Media Personalities, 39 Media, Culture, & Soc’y 
850, 850–53 (2016).
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II. Chevrons and Separability: Star athletica v. varSity
Varsity Brands (Varsity) and Star Athletica (Star) were more than ordi-
nary rivals before their copyright lawsuit began in 2011.  Star was founded in 
January of 2011 by the Liebe family, which also owns R.J. Liebe Athletic Let-
tering Company.  R.J. Liebe was one of Varsity’s suppliers until the company 
terminated the agreement.64  The Liebe family responded by creating Star Ath-
letica and hiring away some of Varsity’s employees.  During the earliest stages 
of the case, Varsity contended in its arguments before a federal district court 
that some of the employees that Star hired took Varsity’s proprietary designs, 
lettering, and monographing.65  It was for these reasons that the case initially 
included, alongside the copyright violation claims, claims for trademark vio-
lation, unfair competition, breach of contract, and civil conspiracy.  Five years 
later, only the copyright claim reached the Supreme Court.
The district court ultimately ruled with Star regarding its copyright claim 
and, through a series of decisions, dispatched Varsity’s other claims.66  The Sixth 
Circuit overturned the district court’s copyright conclusion by a two-to-one 
vote in 2015, contending that the district court “erroneously concluded that 
Varsity’s designs were not copyrightable.”67  In reversing the lower court’s deci-
sion, the judges outlined the longstanding difficulties in determining whether a 
useful item can be protected by copyright, recognizing that “courts have strug-
gled mightily” to find a solution.68  The opinion lists nine approaches judges 
and scholars have put forth regarding how courts can determine whether a 
“pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work” can be identified before articulating 
its own approach, which included a series of questions about the nature of 
the work.69  The judges concluded that the cheerleading uniform arrangements 
were more like fabric designs than dress designs.70  A dress design, according to 
the circuit judges, revolves around its cut and physical design, while a “fabric 
design” deals with the creative arrangement on the garment.  Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court paid rather limited attention to Sixth Circuit’s careful analy-
sis, hardly citing the court’s reasoning in the opinion, concurrence, or dissent.
From the opening passage of the decision, Justice Thomas framed 
the Court’s task as clarifying the foundational aspects of the two-step 
64 Erin Geiger Smith, Who Owns Cheerleader Uniform Designs?  It is up to the Supreme 
Court, N.Y. Times (Oct. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/30/sports/who-
owns-cheerleader-uniform-designs-its-up-to-the-supreme-court.html?mcubz=1&_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/6LB7-42NK]; Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, No. 2:10-cv-
02508, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159413, at *5–6 (W.D. Tenn. 2011).
65 Varsity Brands, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159413, at *6.
66 Id. at *20–24; see also Varsity Brands v. Star Athletica, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
26279, at 2–4 (W.D. Tenn. 2014).
67 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 494 (6th Cir. 2015).
68 Id. at 484.
69 Id. at 484–85.
70 Id. at 493.
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separability test that was created in Mazer v. Stein in 1954.71  The test was cre-
ated to determine whether utility items that have artistic elements can be 
copyright protected, since U.S. law does not extend such safeguards to purely 
utility items.  In particular, the separability test and the Court’s questions con-
sidered the cheerleading uniform designs as “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works,” as outlined in Section 101 of the Copyright Act.72  The separability test 
is applied to useful objects, in this case a cheerleading uniform, to determine 
if design elements can be copyrighted.  First, the test requires that a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural element must first be perceivable as “a two- or three-di-
mensional work of art” that is separable from the useful article.73  Second, the 
feature in question must be capable of existing as a form of art when affixed to 
“to some other tangible medium of expression.”74
In a 6–2 decision, the Court held that, according to the separability test, 
the designs on the cheerleaders’ uniforms can be copyrighted because the 
arrangement of chevrons, lines, and other shapes can be conceptually sepa-
rated from their utilitarian function.75  The artistic design could be protected 
by copyright because the placement of the chevrons, lines, and shapes was not 
inherently part of the function of the cheerleading uniform and the designs 
could be removed and placed on another form of media, such as a painter’s 
canvas, and remain definable as a form of art.  Thus, in the Court’s understand-
ing of the separability test, the designs that were placed on the uniforms were 
protected.  In explaining the Court’s interpretation of the test, Justice Thomas 
characterized Section 101 of the federal copyright code as a mirror image of 
Section 113.  Section 101 focuses on the utility item that includes artistic con-
siderations, seeking to define the creative aspects separately from utility items 
by classifying them as “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” which include 
“ . . . two-dimensional and three- dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied 
art.”76  Section 113 focuses on art that was initially affixed to a traditional form 
of media, but was later applied to a utility item.77  Using this line of reason-
ing, Justice Thomas concluded that the crucial question in the separability test 
is whether the item, if it had “originally been fixed in some tangible medium 
other than a useful article before being applied to a useful article,” was eligible 
for copyright protection.  Importantly, Justice Thomas concluded his opinion 
71 Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017) (citing Mazer, 347 U.S. at 
201).
72 17 U.S.C. § 101.
73 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007. 
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1012.
76 17 U.S.C. § 101.
77 Id. § 113.
2019] GIVE ME A © 33
for the Court by emphasizing that the decision does not extend to copyright 
protections for “the shape, cut, and physical dimensions” of garments.78
Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate opinion, concurring in judgment only, 
to suggest abandoning the separability test and, instead, viewing the cheer uni-
form designs as a work of art reproduced on the uniform.79  In reference to 
the separability test, Justice Ginsburg emphasized, “[c]onsideration of that 
test is unwarranted because the designs at issue are not designs of useful arti-
cles.  Instead, the designs are themselves copyrightable pictorial or graphic 
works reproduced on useful articles.”80  Essentially, Justice Ginsburg concluded 
that when Varsity registered for the copyright of its two-dimensional graphic 
designs, they were guaranteed the legal rights associated with copyright, includ-
ing the exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted designs.81  When Varsity 
reproduced the two-dimensional designs on the three-dimensional uniforms, 
it was using its right, as the copyright holder, to reproduce and create deriv-
ative works.  Justice Ginsburg included Varsity’s copyright paperwork in the 
appendix of her opinion, highlighting that under the section “Nature of this 
work” on the copyright form, Varsity listed it as “2-dimensional artwork.”82 
She explained that the copyright was for the design on the uniform only—
not for the structure or measurements of the garment itself.  In this sense, the 
uniform is the tangible form of media to which the art was affixed.  Her con-
clusions overlap with Justice Thomas’s discussion of the mirrorlike qualities of 
Sections 101 and 113 in the copyright law.  While Justice Ginsburg did not sub-
stantially refer to Section 113, the passage, much like her opinion, emphasizes 
that a copyright holder has “the exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work” in any type of “article, whether useful or 
otherwise.”83  Justice Ginsburg found that the physical uniforms Varsity man-
ufactured were a reproduction of the two-dimensional designs the company 
registered for copyright.  This interpretation of the copyright law does not call 
for revisions in the law, but it suggests a different way for courts, lawyers, and 
designers to use existing law in order to protect fashion designs.
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer, who was joined by Justice Ken-
nedy, contended the design features Varsity was trying to secure were not 
eligible for copyright protection.84  He illustrated this point with Van Gogh’s 
painting of an old pair of shoes.  Justice Breyer explained that Van Gogh’s paint-
ing was copyrightable, but it would not qualify as a copyrightable shoe design.85 
78 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1016.
79 Id. at 1019 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
80 Id.
81 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1019 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
82 Id. at 1020–21.
83 17 U.S.C. § 113.
84 Star Athletica,137 S. Ct. at 1030 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 1032–33.
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Justice Breyer applied the same separability test the majority did but came to a 
different conclusion.  He interpreted the test as requiring that the item in ques-
tion remain useful after the artistic elements are removed.  He explained that 
“if extracting the claimed features would necessarily bring along the underly-
ing useful article, the design is not separable from the useful article.”86  While 
Justice Breyer did not apply his understanding of the test directly to the cheer-
leading uniforms in question, his concern cohered with Judge McKeague’s 
dissent from the Sixth Circuit decision.  Judge McKeague contended that a 
plain skirt and crop top, essentially a cheerleading uniform absent the chev-
rons, stripes, and wording, would no longer be recognizable as a cheerleading 
uniform.  Removing the artistic elements, to Judge McKeague, meant taking 
the utility away from the uniform.  In that sense, the artistic items were tied 
to the utility of the uniform and, therefore, not copyrightable.87  Justice Breyer 
contended that separability, the effect of removing the artistic elements from 
the utility object, must be a part of the separability test.  Without such a require-
ment, which the Court’s opinion rejected, Justice Breyer maintained that any 
utility item could receive copyright protection.  The observer merely must pic-
ture a frame or the item’s placement in a gallery to declare it as copyrightable.
Finally, Justice Breyer concluded his dissent by highlighting that Congress 
has never, despite the fashion industry’s efforts, extended specific protections 
to clothing and accessories.  He asserted that “Congress had rejected every 
one of approximately 70 design protection bills that had been introduced since 
1914.”88  Justice Breyer supported his conclusions by indicating that, despite 
the lack of specific protection for designs, the fashion industry continues to 
thrive.  Ultimately, all three opinions presented fundamentally different con-
ceptualizations regarding the nature of clothing designs, the intended meaning 
of copyright laws, and the applicability of the separability test.
III. Originality, Monopolies, and Mazer’s Megaphone
The Supreme Court’s decision in Star Athletica was substantially guided 
in two different and crucial ways by the justices’ reasoning in Mazer v. Stein in 
1954.  First, Mazer was decided using the Copyright Act of 1909.  In Congress’s 
major revision of the Act in 1976, it adopted the Court’s wording from Mazer 
regarding “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”89  Thus, the precedent 
from the case led to an expansion in the range of the categories of protected 
works from “works of art or designs for works of art” in 1909 to the “pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works” definition that was added in 1976 and applied 
in Star Athletica.  Second, the Court in Mazer formulated the separability test 
86 Id. at 1033.
87 Varsity Brands, 799 F.3d at 495 (McKeague, J., dissenting).
88 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1034.
89 Melville Nimmer, The Subject Matter of Copyright Under the Act of 1976, 24 UCLA L. 
Rev. 978, 998 (1976); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102.
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that the justices in Star Athletica sought to clarify.90  The test was established 
when Mazer copyrighted statuettes that were used as lamp bases and Stein and 
others copied the designs of the statuettes for their own lamps.  Mazer sued for 
copyright infringement, contending that the dancing figure that constituted the 
lamp stand was artistic as well as practical.91  It was this dual quality of utility 
and creativity that made the justices wary of extending copyright protection 
to statuettes while they also functioned as patentable lamp bases.  The justices 
communicated in the decision that they were concerned about extending intel-
lectual property-based monopolies to certain otherwise everyday, useful items. 
Ultimately, the Court concluded that granting copyright protection to the artis-
tic aspects of the lamp did not halt others from creating lamps that included 
statuettes; it simply gave Mazer the power to control the use of copies of his 
statuettes “as such or as incorporated in some other article.”92  Thus, the origi-
nality of the statuette was protected, despite its functional nature.
Justice Reed, who wrote the Court’s opinion, emphasized that the statu-
ettes were created separately from the lamps.  He outlined Mazer’s contentions 
that the statuettes were made in clay, then crafted into production molds, at 
which point Mazer registered his creations with the U.S. Copyright Office as 
“works of art.”93  Mazer sold the statuettes as standalone works and as a part 
of the lamp.  Justice Reed explained that “[t]he dichotomy of protection for the 
aesthetic is not beauty and utility but art for the copyright and the invention of 
original and ornamental design for design patents,” which grants equal protec-
tion for the artist and the inventor.94  Thus, the separability test established that 
the dual nature of designs does not automatically create an either/or scenario; 
instead, it allows for two types of intellectual property protection to coexist 
for one product.  The Court ultimately granted protection to the works that 
were involved in the Mazer case, creating the precedent that artistic items can 
receive copyright protection when they are incorporated into utility items.
A. Ownership and the Monopoly of Ideas
The petitioners in Mazer contended that extending copyright protection 
to the lampstands would lead to certain designers gaining monopolies (in the 
form of controlling distribution rights) over certain types of useful items.  The 
petitioners argued that such a decision would be “a misuse of copyright as to 
make the registration invalid.”95  Despite the Court’s decision in Mazer and the 
creation of the separability approach, similar concerns about the ownership 
of useful designs have persisted in cases that involve works that are associated 
90 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007.
91 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 202–03.
92 Id. at 218.
93 Id. at 202–03.
94 Id. at 218.
95 Id. at 206.
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with utilitarian purposes.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia made its concern regarding the monopolization of designs central to its 
decision in a case in which parties disagreed whether a light fixture’s design 
was copyrightable.96  Similarly, a federal district court struck down a candle 
seller’s claim that its store design could be copyrighted.  The judge concluded 
that the court “will not grant the plaintiff enduring monopoly control over the 
functional characteristics of a colonial-style shop.”97  Justice Breyer raised a 
similar concern in Star Athletica, claiming in his dissent that allowing designers 
to copyright their fashion creations would lead to the higher prices associ-
ated with copyright monopolies.98  Some sixty years earlier, the key question 
in Mazer had been whether a designer could copyright one part of his prod-
uct and patent the other.  If so, he could monopolize the lamp market through 
intellectual property protection.  The Court held that “the patentability of the 
statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, does not bar copyright as works of art.”99 
The Court emphasized that granting a copyright to Mazer’s lampstand-bound 
statuettes did not preclude other companies from making their own statu-
ette-based lamps.  The decision simply gave Mazer the power to copyright his 
lampstand and statuette combination.
This point is crucial when considering copyright protections for fash-
ion designs.  Copyright and patent protection would not necessarily lead to 
a monopoly because even similar lamp designs could be granted equal intel-
lectual property protection.  In Mazer, Justice Reed used an anecdote from 
a 1924 case that involved two mapmakers to illustrate this phenomenon.  He 
explained that that case spoke “of two men, each a perfectionist, independently 
making maps of the same territory.  Though the maps are identical, each may 
obtain the exclusive right to make copies of his own particular map, and yet 
neither will infringe the other’s copyright.”100  In other words, ownership of 
the copyright is not the equivalent of a monopoly on the idea because “absent 
copying there can be no infringement of copyright.”101
B. Originality
Before the courts can begin to resolve whether artistic elements of 
a utility item can be separated and, ultimately, protected by copyright, the 
non-useful elements must be deemed copyrightable in the first place.  Justice 
Thomas emphasized this concern in the Court’s opinion in Star Athletica, writ-
ing that “[t]he first element of a copyright-infringement claim is ‘ownership of 
96 Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
97 Yankee Candle Co. v. New England Candle Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 154 (D. Mass.), vacated 
pursuant to settlement sub nom., 29 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D. Mass. 1998).
98 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1034 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
99 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217.
100 Id. at 218; see also Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
101 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218.
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a valid copyright.’”102  Similarly, in Mazer, Justice Reed emphasized that the 
copyright law does not attempt to define art.  Instead, it requires that the art-
ist’s idea be affixed to a tangible expression of an idea.103  These concerns are 
grounded in the Copyright Act itself, which instructs that “[i]n no case does 
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discov-
ery, regardless of the form.”104  The Supreme Court examined this concern most 
directly in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service in 1991.105  Feist Pub-
lications sought to license the telephone listings that were contained in Rural 
Telephone Service’s directories.  When Rural refused to license the listings to 
Feist, the company used the listings anyway.  Many of the listings were identi-
cal to the originals in Rural’s directory.
Justice O’Connor wrote in the Court’s opinion that “[t]he sine qua non 
of copyright is originality,” meaning that an item is not eligible for copyright 
protection without originality.106  A work is original, according to the Court, 
when it is “independently created by the author” and “possesses at least some 
minimal degree of creativity.”107  Under this definition, the section of the phone 
book that Feist reproduced was ineligible for copyright protection on its own 
because the material was not original; it was a simple list of facts.  Rural’s 
employees may have collected the information that Feist used, but they did not 
create the information.  They also could not be credited for creating an original 
work using the facts they accumulated.  They merely gathered the facts from 
another source.  If the “phonebook standard” for originality is applied to fash-
ion design, the utility items are comparable to facts, while the designs could be 
understood as similar to the projection of ideas onto a tangible form of media, 
whether they are conceptualized as new arrangements of original facts, such as 
what is found in commentary on works in the public domain, or entirely new 
works expressed on a useful medium.  Problematically, the combination of util-
ity and the derivative nature of what has preceded it make it “difficult to create 
a design that is sufficiently original to prevent others from creating one that is 
strikingly similar.”108   Thus, defining originality joins separability as a crucial 
challenge for the courts when it comes to determining whether designs can be 
protected under copyright.
Similarly, the questions from International News Service v. Associ-
ated Press provide a similar, and helpful, parallel regarding the originality 
102 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1008.
103 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 214.
104 17 U.S.C. § 101–02.
105 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991).
106 Id. at 348.
107 Id. at 345.
108 David M. Adler, Fashion Law: Protecting Brands and Designs, 5 Landslide 21, 22 
(2013).
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questions that arise regarding copyright protections for fashion designs.  Asso-
ciated Press, which was decided in 1918, just short of a century before Star 
Athletica, revolved around International News Service’s practice of obtaining 
information from the Associated Press through bribery, persuasion, and copy-
ing.109  Both organizations gathered news and distributed it to newspapers that 
subscribed to their services.  When it was found that the International News 
Service was simply rewriting the Associated Press’s news bulletins and trans-
mitting them to its subscribers, the Associated Press contended its copyright 
was violated.  While the Court ultimately ruled in the Associated Press’s favor, 
Justice Pitney emphasized in the Court’s short opinion that “the substance of 
the information and the particular form or collocation of words in which the 
writer has communicated it” are two different considerations.110  Thus, facts 
cannot be copyrighted, but the presentation of facts in the form of a news story 
can be.  No one owns the news, but they can own the packaging and retelling 
of the news.  News articles are eligible for copyright protection because, sim-
ilar to literary copyright protection, the articles are the result of the author’s 
work.  In a parallel sense, we can conclude that a shirt or a dress cannot be 
copyrighted because it is essentially a fact with insufficient originality, while a 
fashion design—a collection and presentation of facts, if we follow the Court’s 
reasoning in Associated Press—can qualify for copyright.  The clothing design, 
essentially, is like a news story in this instance.  The choices and arrangement of 
different elements, or facts, elevates it to an original work, despite its composi-
tion being substantially of utility items such as cloth, thread, or plastic.
IV. Photography, Belt Buckles, and the Courts
As America’s understanding of art evolves, copyright protections evolve 
with it.  In the 1880s, photography was a relatively new concept.  The photog-
raphy process was technical, so there was extensive debate about whether or 
not photographs could ever be perceived as high art and, by extension, eligi-
ble for copyright protection.  In 1884, even before the Copyright Act of 1909, 
the Supreme Court found in Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony that certain 
photographs were eligible for copyright protection.111  Using the Constitution’s 
wording regarding copyright protections and the Copyright Act of 1790, which 
only specifically referred to “authors,” the Court concluded that the photogra-
pher had employed his “own intellectual conception” in the photograph, which 
was enough to satisfy the justices’ criteria for meriting copyright protection.112 
The Court suggested that the photographer’s costume selection, careful 
posing of his subject, addition of draperies, and use of light proved a degree 
109 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 231 (1918).
110 Id. at 234.
111 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 53 (1884).
112 Id. at 58; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
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of intellectual conception.113  Similarly, fashion designs are intellectual concep-
tions of the designers, and the characteristics of their works share substantial 
similarities to the types of claims that other artists have made.  A designer’s use 
of silhouette, fabric selection, color, and aesthetic effect can be compared to 
the choices a photographer or painter makes.  If the logic of the Burrow-Giles 
opinion extends to other mediums of artwork, fashion designs should be con-
sidered in a similar light with regard to copyright law.  The Burrow-Giles case 
also demonstrates that the legal understanding of art can evolve to include 
new media.  The Court accepted the photographer’s argument that he was the 
author of the image, thus allowing the existing wording of the law to stretch to 
a medium that was not explicitly protected at the time.
Just over a century later, another photography-related case examined the 
extent to which a photographer’s ideas and conceptual execution of an image 
can be protected.  In Rogers v. Koons, a federal appeals court examined which 
elements of a work of art were copyrightable.114  Art Rogers, a California-based 
photographer who had published his images in books and showed them in 
exhibitions, was paid to take a photograph of a husband and wife and their 
puppies in 1980.115  Years later, he worked with a publisher to make postcards 
of the black-and-white image.  In 1987, Jeff Koons, an artist who had exhib-
ited and sold his at-times controversial works, created a sculpture that copied 
the composition of Rogers’s photograph.116  Rogers sued Koons for copyright 
infringement and unfair competition.  Koons explained that he encountered 
Rogers’s postcard in a “very commercial, tourist-like card shop.”117  He under-
stood the image as “mass culture.”118  Essentially, he interpreted the image as a 
statement regarding society rather than an image of a couple with their dogs. 
Despite the different intent and form of media, the court sided with Rogers. 
The judge found that copyright protected the original components of a work 
of art.  While the idea of a couple and their dogs could not be copyrighted, the 
specific way the people and dogs were arranged could be.119  Thus, the decision 
in Rogers communicates a legal rationale for how the conceptualization and 
execution of an idea can be protected without at the same time extending a 
monopoly regarding that concept or idea to the copyright holder.
A. Fair Use and Parody in Fashion
Those who use copyrighted works without permission can, in many 
instances, claim that their creations are a fair use or a parody of the original. 
113 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60.
114 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992).
115 Id. at 303–04.
116 Id. at 304–05.
117 Id. at 305.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 304.
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The doctrine of fair use was designed to support the original intent of copy-
right protections, which was to encourage “productive thought and public 
instruction.”120  In other words, by temporarily limiting a copyright holder’s 
claim to the copyrighted creation in certain instances, society benefits from a 
variety of public goods, such as inspiration, education, and innovation.  Section 
107 of the U.S. copyright code specifically states that fair use allows for the use 
of copyrighted works without permission for the purposes of criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research.121  When evaluating 
copyright violation claims in which a person has used another’s work without 
permission but contends it was a fair use, the courts generally consider: (1) the 
purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) 
the amount of the work used, and (4) the effect on the market value of the 
original.122  Courts have used the fair use test in a number of cases to deter-
mine the validity of a copyright infringement claim.123  Unlike fair use, parody 
is not explicitly listed in the Copyright Act.  The Supreme Court, however, 
has upheld the parody defense, which generally incorporates elements of legal 
expectations for fair use.  In particular, the Court has recognized that a parody 
must bear resemblance to the original work in order to function; thus, parody 
has been categorized alongside fair use.124
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music in 1994, the Court concluded that the 
rap group 2 Live Crew’s unlicensed use of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman” 
was a parody and therefore a protected use.125  Justice Souter, in opening the 
Court’s opinion, explained that “we hold that a parody’s commercial character 
is only one element to be weighed in a fair use enquiry, and that insufficient con-
sideration was given [by the lower court] to the nature of parody in weighing 
the degree of copying.”126  The Court understood parody as being intertwined 
with fair use.  Later in the opinion, Justice Souter wrote that “[p]arody needs to 
mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation 
of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination.”127   Similarly, in 2001, the 
Eleventh Circuit concluded that Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone, a book 
that told Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With the Wind from the perspective of the 
slaves, was a fair use because it was a critique and parody of the original.128 
120 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1110 (1990).
121 17 U.S.C. § 107.
122 Id.
123 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994); Keep Thomson Governor 
Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957 (D.N.H. 1978); Elsmere Music, 
Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 492 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 
572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
124 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569, 580–81.
125 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994).
126 Id. at 572.
127 Id. at 580–81.
128 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001).
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The court concluded that “[a] parody is a work that seeks to comment upon or 
criticize another work by appropriating elements of the original.”129  In both of 
these instances, courts recognized the value of copyright claims for the creators 
of original works but emphasized the importance of allowing others to com-
ment upon, criticize, or otherwise transform the works.  Within the context of 
fashion designs, such conclusions help allay concerns that granting copyrights 
to fashion works will lead to monopolies on utility items rather than unique 
executions of ideas on a form of media.
Fair use and parody protect certain media presentations of fashion 
designers’ designs.  An example of this would be a newspaper covering a fash-
ion show and publishing photographs of the designs.  The publication of the 
photos, which facilitates the ability of others to copy a design, falls under the 
fair use news-reporting exemption.  Designers cannot exercise exclusive con-
trol over the public portrayals of their work.  Beyond seeing reports about 
upcoming fashion designs, copyists have used fair use and parody as defenses 
for substantially drawing their designs from the works of other brands and 
designers.  One of the most significant fashion-related cases of alleged copy-
right infringement that effectively employed a fair use legal defense was 
Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog in 2007.130  Haute Diggity Dog, 
a company that manufactures dog toys that parody luxury brands, created 
products such as “Chewnel No. 5,” “Sniffany & Co,” and “Chewy Vuiton.”131 
Louis Vuitton Malletier (LVM) sued Haute Diggity Dog alleging trademark 
infringement, trademark dilution, and copyright infringement.132  The Chewy 
Vuiton dog toys were designed to look like LVM handbags.  Haute Diggity 
Dog changed Louis Vuitton to Chewy Vuiton, the traditional “LV” monogram 
to a “CV” monogram, and printed loose imitations of the other LVM sym-
bols on the dog toys.133  The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Chewy Vuiton 
toys were not likely to confuse consumers.  A person would not reasonably 
purchase a Chewy Vuiton item instead of a Louis Vuitton item.  Furthermore, 
the court found that the Chewy Vuiton and LVM marks were not sufficiently 
similar, were sold at different price points, and were not likely to impair the dis-
tinctiveness of the LVM brand.134  Ultimately, the Chewy Vuiton product was 
a successful parody because it created an association with the famous mark 
but intentionally communicated that it was not the famous mark.135  Much as 
Justice Souter explained in Campbell, the dog-related products included “just 
129 Id. at 1271.
130 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 266 (4th Cir. 
2007).
131 Id. at 258.
132 Id. at 256.
133 Id. at 256–57.
134 Id. at 260.
135 Id.
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enough of the original design to allow the consumer to appreciate the point 
of parody.”136
Additionally, the Chewy Vuiton dog toys were an acceptable parody 
because the LVM products did not exist in the same market.  LVM does not 
manufacture dog toys.  The difference in the markets confirms that this is not a 
blatant design copy.  The differences between the products and their potential 
markets in Haute Diggity Dog leave questions regarding the extent of parody 
work that is permissible when the products share the same potential customers. 
In 2016, LVM sued another company for copyright and trademark infringe-
ment.  My Other Bag is a company that sells tote bags with cartoon drawings 
of famous handbags, including Louis Vuitton bags, with the text “My Other 
Bag . . . ”137  The district judge ruled in favor of My Other Bag, citing the pop-
ular joke “my other car .  .  . ” as evidence that the tote bags were created as 
a jest.138  The judge evaluated the fair use factors and found no harm on the 
ultimate market value of a Louis Vuitton bag.139  In both of the LVM cases, 
the courts found the parody exception for fashion design acceptable when the 
parody does not confuse consumers or dilute the market value of the original 
work.  Both Haute Diggity Dog and My Other Bag sold at substantially lower 
price points than any LVM product.  Additionally, the parody works were not 
intended to confuse consumers; rather, they poked fun at the popularity and 
price point of the fashion giant.  Parody and other fair use-related defenses 
provide an avenue for designers and others to incorporate the ideas of others 
into their work in certain circumstances.  Such defenses essentially act as a 
safeguard, along with strict conceptualizations of the copyright law more gen-
erally, against designer-related monopolies.
B. Art and Utility in Copyright Cases
Parody cases such as Haute Diggity and My Other Bag include clear com-
mentary or humor-related uses of existent copyright claims.  In many other 
instances, courts have faced copyright claims in which other designers, as in 
Star Athletica, clearly produced substantially similar works in their efforts to 
reap commercial gain.  In Peter Pan Fabrics v. Dan River Mills, a 1969 deci-
sion from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, rival 
companies disagreed regarding whether or not a fabric pattern titled “ Daisies” 
could be protected under copyright law.140  Dan River Mills copied the pat-
136 Id. at 261 (quoting People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 
366 (4th Cir. 2001)).
137 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, Inc. 156 F. Supp. 3d 425, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016).
138 Id.
139 Id. at 435–39.
140 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1366, 1367–68 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969).
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tern, and when Peter Pan Fabrics learned about the duplication, it sued for an 
injunction that would halt any use of the pattern by Dan River Mills.  The pat-
tern, Dan River Mills claimed, lacked originality, contending that a series of 
daises on white fabric was not unique enough to warrant protection.  The judge 
upheld Peter Pan’s copyright, explaining that “[p]laintiffs do not argue that a 
daisy or any reproduction of it or its features is original.  Their argument is that 
‘the juxtaposition of these flowers and their arrangement on the plain back-
ground . . . and the layout and combination of separate features are completely 
original.’”141  Finally, Dan River Mills contended that if Peter Pan’s pattern was 
original, their own daisy fabric was substantially different.  The judge found the 
patterns were too similar to be separated from one another, concluding, “the 
similarities are so great that an ordinary observer would easily detect them.”142 
The original design was considered a work of art, which is copyrightable under 
Section 101 of the U.S. copyright code.  Crucially, and quite similarly to Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion in Star Athletica, the subsequent fabric 
prints were considered reproductions of a work of art.  The fabric itself was a 
derivative work, which the copyright holder had the right to produce, having 
registered the copyright for “Style 2464, Range 11, ‘Daisies’” with the Copy-
right Office.143  Similarly, the cheerleading uniforms in Star Athletica were first 
registered as two-dimensional drawings and then made into garments.
Just over a decade later, the same court expanded on the reasoning and 
interpretation of Peter Pan.  In Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, the 
court determined whether or not the design on a belt buckle could be copy-
righted.144  Drawing substantially from Mazer, the court reasoned that legal 
and precedential guidance in this area erred on the side of allowing commerce, 
rather than exclusive ownership of designs.  The judge explained that “[t]hus 
far Congress and the Supreme Court have answered in favor of commerce and 
the masses rather than the artists, designers and the well-to-do.  Any change 
must be left to those higher authorities.”145  Thus, the court concluded that 
any artistic feature incorporated into a useful object needs to be separately 
identifiable and capable of existing as a work of art.  Such a conclusion is sub-
stantially similar to Justice Breyer’s dissent in Star Athletica.  He contended 
the cheerleading uniform, or any item, must remain functional after the artis-
tic element is removed.146  In Kieselstein-Cord, the rival company, Accessories 
by Pearl, admitted it had intentionally copied the exact designs of two differ-
ent Kieselstein-Cord belt buckles.  It claimed, however, that the belts were 
utility items, not art.  The district court agreed, concluding that “[a]lthough 
141 Id. at 1368.
142 Id. at 1369.
143 Id. at 1367.
144 Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 990 (2d Cir. 1980).
145 Id. at 999.
146 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1031–33 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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plaintiff asserts that the buckles are jewelry or sculpture, they appear to be 
primarily belt buckles.  Belt buckles are utilitarian objects designed to fasten 
belts.”147  In contrasting the case with Mazer, the judge explained that the statu-
ettes could be identified as art separately from the lamps, while the belt buckles 
and their designs were not severable.  Even if they could be separated, the 
judge explained, the buckle would no longer function.148  Of course, the Court 
in Star Athletica, aside from Justice Breyer’s dissent, rejected the functionality 
requirement.  The limited scope of the Star Athletica opinion means that the 
separability of the design from the utility item remains an important concern. 
Ultimately, however, the court of appeals in Kieselstein-Cord overturned the 
district court’s ruling, concluding that the belt buckles were “conceptually sep-
arable sculptural elements.”149
The district court in Kieselstein-Cord contrasted the belt buckles involved 
in the case before it with a 1960 decision about glassware design.  The judge 
in Kieselstein-Cord explained that in Syracuse China Corp. v. Stanley Roberts, 
the designs on a fine-china manufacturer’s plates and glassware were copy-
rightable, while the utility items themselves were not.150  In the actual Syracuse 
China decision, however, the judge made no mention of such a distinction. 
Instead, the judge in the case emphasized the risk of economic harm to Syra-
cuse China’s business if the copies from a competitor were allowed to flood the 
market.151  The judge in Kieselstein-Cord continued by relegating the belt buck-
les to the “world of fashion design,” which he contended was not related to 
literature or art.152  He continued, explaining that a design “superimposed upon 
fabric is copyrightable, whereas the style of the dress . . . in which the fabric is 
used is not [copyrightable], no matter how original, ornamental, or nonessen-
tial for the function of that design may be.”153
Kieselstein-Cord and Star Athletica encountered some of the same diffi-
culties.  In both cases, the companies sought protection for designs that were 
deliberately created for a useful article.  Without the belt buckle itself, the 
engraving design would retain the shape of a belt buckle, the same way the 
designs on the cheerleading uniform retained the shape of a cheerleading uni-
form.  These cases were decided using the same separability test established 
in Mazer and had similar facts, but the courts provided different results.  In 
1995, however, the Second Circuit developed a substantially different rationale 
147 Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, 489 F. Supp. 732, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev’d, 632 
F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
148 Id.
149 Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993.
150 Kieselstein-Cord, 489 F. Supp at 736 (citing Syracuse China Corp. v. Stanley Roberts, 
Inc., 180 F. Supp. 527, 528 (S.D.N.Y.1960)).
151 Syracuse China Corp., 180 F. Supp. at 528.
152 Kieselstein-Cord, 489 F. Supp. at 737.
153 Id.
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in Knitwaves v. Lollytogs.154  Knitwaves created a collection of sweaters with 
fall motifs, including two sweaters that had copyright protection: the “Leaf 
Sweater” and the “Squirrel Cardigan.”  Two years later, Lollytogs released a 
competing line of sweaters with similar designs to the Leaf Sweater and Squir-
rel Cardigan.  A Lollytogs design executive directed the manager of the design 
department to create sweater sets with the “same feel” as the Knitwaves Leaf 
Sweater and Squirrel Cardigan.155  The manager of the Lollytogs design depart-
ment made changes to the original Knitwaves sweater, including rearranging 
the placement of the leaf appliques and adding acorns to the design.156  The 
case does not mention Mazer, the separability test, or any of the district court’s 
reasoning in Kieselstein-Cord.  Instead, the court used the substantial similar-
ity test to decide the case.  The test asked if an average person would observe 
the same aesthetic appeal from both designs even if the observer did not set 
out to detect similarities.  The court concluded, despite the limited differences 
between the two sweaters, that Lollytogs’s arrangement was “substantially 
similar.”157  Quite uniquely, the court recognized that clothes are “useful items” 
and are not copyrightable, but “fabric designs, such as the artwork on Knit-
waves’ sweaters, are considered ‘writings’ for the purpose of copyright law.”158 
Thus, the court essentially shifted fashion design from the “pictorial, graphic, 
and sculptural works” category to the far less complex “literary works” part 
of Section 102 of the Copyright Act.  According to this reasoning, a blank gar-
ment is a utility item and either not copyrightable or only considerable under 
the “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” category, while a fashion design 
is comparable to a work of fiction, a type of art that includes no equivalent to 
the separability test.
C. Trade Dress and “Aesthetic Functionality”
Historically, in the absence of clear copyright protections for fashion 
designers, they have turned to trade dress, a part of trademark law, to defend 
their works from being pirated.159  Trade dress, however, comes with substantial 
limitations, particularly because it requires that “the matter sought to be pro-
tected is not functional.”160  Thus, the trade-dress approach finds itself caught 
up in some of the same questions that arise in copyright cases.  Courts are 
therefore left, once again, to wrestle with the artistic-or-practical dichotomy 
that has dominated the reasoning behind the separability test for more than 
sixty years.  In addition to functionality concerns, the trademark aspects that 
154 Knitwaves v. Lollytogs, 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995).
155 Id. at 1000.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 1004.
158 Id. at 1002.
159 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(3) (2012).
160 Id.
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are inherent in trade dress require that the aspect the designer seeks to protect, 
such as a red sole on Louboutin brand shoes, must have acquired a secondary 
meaning.  It cannot simply be a shoe.  It must also be a symbol that individ-
uals associate with a certain product or designer.  If a company can establish 
that there is a secondary meaning, the unique brand identifier is protected in 
the same way as a trademark.  Such a concern was at the center of Louboutin 
v. Yves Saint Laurent, which started in the same New York–based federal dis-
trict court as Knitwaves, Kieselstein-Cord, and Peter Pan.  This case reached the 
Second Circuit, like Knitwaves, and was decided in 2012.  Since the early 1990s, 
fashion designer Christian Louboutin has made the lacquered red-gloss soles 
on the high-heeled shoes he creates his calling card.  He applied for a trade-
mark for the design and received it in early 2008.  Three years later, Louboutin 
learned that Yves Saint Laurent planned to release a line of single-colored 
shoes, including one that was entirely red, even the sole.  Louboutin sued 
for trademark violation and sought an injunction to halt Yves Saint Laurent 
from bringing the shoe to market.161  The federal district court rejected the 
injunction request, concluding that the soles of shoes are functional and that a 
designer cannot claim the rights to a single color.162  The circuit court rejected 
this logic, ruling that the district court had made its decision “based on an 
incorrect understanding of aesthetic functionality.”163  The court further con-
cluded that the red-sole mark had taken on a secondary meaning associated 
with the designer.
Importantly for this Article, the court’s articulation of “utilitarian” versus 
“aesthetic” functionality provides an alternative to attempting to separate 
utility from art in copyright cases.  The court explained that, according to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, traditional 
functionality is related to the “essential purpose of the article” and if that use-
fulness “affects the cost or quality.”164  If the product falls under such purpose 
and cost concerns, as articulated in Inwood, the potential for trademark can be 
resolved there.  The court, however, explained that if “the aesthetic design of a 
product is itself the mark for which protection is sought,” a different standard 
is needed.165  The court thus laid out a three-part test that included consid-
ering whether the aspects in question were “essential to the use or purpose” 
and if such aspects affected “the cost or quality.”166  Both of these prongs were 
161 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 213 (2d 
Cir. 2012).
162 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 458 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 
2012).
163 Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 228.
164 Id. at 219 (quoting Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 (1982)).
165 Id. at 219–20.
166 Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
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taken from the Inwood standard, as well as a third prong, which considered the 
effect on competition.  Drawing from the Supreme Court’s decision in Quali-
tex v. Jacobson Products in 1995, the circuit court explained that the final step 
in its aesthetic-functionality approach evaluates the impact that upholding a 
trademark claim on a function-related feature would have on competitors.167 
The circuit court drew its reasoning from Justice Breyer, who would conclude 
in his dissent in Star Athletica that the uniform designs could not be copyright 
protected because their function could not be separated from their design.  In 
writing for the Court in Qualitex, he explained that trademark law does not 
preclude a business from owning exclusive rights to a certain color when it is 
used as part of a functional item.168  In the Qualitex opinion, which upheld a dry 
cleaning supplier’s use of green and gold on its press pads, Justice Breyer con-
cluded that the color “acts as a symbol.  Having developed secondary meaning 
(for customers identified the green-gold color as Qualitex’s), it identifies the 
press pads’ source.  And, the green-gold color serves no other function.”169 
Thus, if the color is nonfunctional to the product and does not halt rival compa-
nies from competing in the market, the trademark of an otherwise ubiquitous 
element, such as a color, can be upheld.  Such a conclusion, and the court’s 
decision in Louboutin to uphold the red-sole mark as a valid trademark, sug-
gests that the separability test, with its utility-versus-art dichotomy, is not the 
only approach possible in fashion-design cases.
V. Fashion and the Development of U.S. Copyright
The separability test that the Supreme Court applied in Star Athletica, 
while finding its roots in the Mazer decision, is also foundationally based in 
traditional conceptualizations of copyright law.  While this Article has touched 
upon different incarnations of the Copyright Act, this Part focuses on the law 
itself and what it communicates regarding protections for designers.  American 
copyright law is based in Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which estab-
lishes that Congress has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”170  Congress built upon 
this twenty-seven-word description when it passed the Copyright Act of 1790, 
which protected books, charts, and maps, but did not mention music, painting, 
or other popular forms of expression from the time.171  Importantly, the law 
started by framing its purpose as being “for the encouragement of learning, by 
securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors 
167 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995).
168 Id. at 164–67.
169 Id. at 166.
170 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
171 Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Cong. Ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
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of such copies.”172  Thus, the initial impetus for copyright protection found in 
the Constitution, as well as the Copyright Act of 1790, made no distinction 
between useful and artistic items, despite the inclusion of maps and charts, 
which it could be argued can have both functional and artistic qualities.
Similarly, the Copyright Act of 1909, the first major revision of the law 
after 1790, does not address whether useful items can be protected.  It does, 
however, introduce the explicit requirement that a work be original.173  Four 
decades later, however, the official Copyright Office regulations guide included 
a revised definition for the “works of art” section of the Copyright Act.  In the 
new version, it defined such items as including “works of artistic craftsmanship, 
in so far as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are con-
cerned.”174  This revision was not missed in the crucial Mazer decision in 1954. 
The Court brought together a series of cases that had touched upon copyright 
protections for useful items, as well as the relatively new Copyright Office reg-
ulations, to construct the separability test and the murky, dichotomous effort 
to split artistic and utilitarian aspects of certain items.  The Court in Star Ath-
letica credited the Court’s decision in Mazer as essentially writing parts of 
what became the Copyright of Act of 1976, the most recent major overhaul of 
the law.175  Justice Thomas explained that “Congress essentially lifted the lan-
guage governing protection for the design of a useful article directly from the 
post–Mazer regulations and placed it into § 101 of the 1976 Act.”176  The Mazer 
Court concluded that works “must be original, that is, the author’s tangible 
expression of his ideas.”177  It furthermore found that artistic elements that are 
a part of useful items could receive copyright protection.178  The 1976 revision 
shifted the “works of art” category to “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural” works 
and added Section 113, which is solely devoted to outlining the boundaries of 
such protections for copyright holders.  Crucially for the questions posed by 
this Article, Section 113 affords the copyright holder the right to reproduce 
copyrighted “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work in copies .  .  . in or on any 
kind of article, whether useful or otherwise.”179  The section, however, proceeds 
172 Id.  The Statute of Anne, passed by Britain’s Parliament in 1710, also started with a 
substantially similar passage, which framed it as a law that protects learning.  See The 
Statute of Anne; April 10, 1710, Yale L. Sch., (last visited Mar. 21, 2019) http://avalon.
law.yale.edu/18th_century/anne_1710.asp [https://perma.cc/FZE4-U57A].
173 Copyright Act of 1909 § 7, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, superseded by 17 
U.S.C. § 103(b) (1976).
174 Richard Pogue, Borderland—Where Copyright and Design Patent Meet, in Copyright 
and Related Topics: A Choice of Articles, 363, 374–75 (L.A. Copyright Soc’y & 
UCLA Sch. of L. eds., 1964).
175 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1011–12.
176 Id.
177 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 214.
178 Id. at 218.
179 17 U.S.C. § 113(a).
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in the passages that follow this statement to narrow the scope of copyright pro-
tections for “useful articles.”180  For example, it outlines that when a work of art 
is reproduced in or on a useful item, the artwork’s copyright holder does not 
receive “any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or 
display of the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to such works.”181 
The Court in Star Athletica emphasized that these passages protect works of 
art that are first affixed to a tangible form of media and then later reproduced 
on or in a useful item.182  The Court continued, however, by contextualizing 
Section 101 as protecting art that is first placed on a useful item.  The difficulty 
with such an understanding of the two different sections of the law, however, 
is that it reinforces a false dichotomy between an item being entirely classifi-
able as useful or artistic, when many items are shades of both.  It also ignores 
that the artistic aspects of the cheerleading uniforms in Star Athletica and the 
lamp in Mazer were conceptualized as art in traditional forms of media, thus 
making them far more applicable to Section 113 than Section 101.  In other 
words, works such as Yves Saint Laurent’s Mondrian dress should be under-
stood under Section 113, because the design was first created in a non-useful 
medium, a painting canvas, and later applied to a useful object, a dress.  Jus-
tice Thomas mentioned Section 113 in only one passage of his opinion for the 
Court in Star Athletica.183  He instead constructed much of its reasoning on 
Section 101, which, under his explanation, would have evaluated the Mondrian 
dress based first and foremost on the separability test, focusing on whether the 
artistic elements on the dress could be removed and placed in another form 
of media.  Conversely, Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring opinion, contended 
that Section 113 should have been controlling in the Court’s reasoning.  She 
wrote, “I would not take up in this case the separability test appropriate under 
17 U. S. C. § 101.  Consideration of that test is unwarranted because the designs 
at issue are not designs of useful articles.”184  Justice Ginsburg’s approach would 
also connect works of fashion that were conceptualized as art and later applied 
to Section 106, which gives artists the exclusive right to prepare derivative ver-
sions of their original works.185  Thus, even within the Copyright Act’s sections, 
jurists have not come to consistent understandings regarding how to classify 
the works of fashion designers.
A. From a Plain White T-Shirt to a “Smoke Dress”
Fashion designs are not explicitly included in any part of the Copyright 
Act.  They are, however, as was the case in Star Athletica, generally classified 
180 Id. § 113(b)–(c).
181 Id. § 113(b).
182 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1011–12.
183 Id. at 1010–11.
184 Id. at 1019 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
185 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1019 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
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as part of the “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work” category, which is one 
of eight listed in Section 102 of the Act.186  As indicated earlier, the category 
requires that “[t]he design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a picto-
rial, graphic, or sculptural work only if . . . such design incorporates pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are 
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”187 
Such a definition immediately creates two challenges.  First, it assumes that 
works of fashion are useful articles that can potentially include artistic ele-
ments.  Second, it assumes that art and utility can be neatly separated.
Fashion designer Iris Van Herpen’s work, for example, challenges the fea-
sibility of such a process.  She created a line of dresses that were inspired by 
refinery smoke.  In creating the dresses, the artist sought to “give the viewer 
this mixed feeling about the collection by manipulating the unpleasant indus-
trial material metal mesh into something soft and lively.”188  Thus, the art and 
the message the artist intended to communicate are difficult to separate from 
the fact that it is wearable.  If, however, we think of utility and fashion as being 
on a spectrum, with basic, noncopyrightable clothing items such as a plain 
white T-shirt on one end and creations like Van Herpen’s “Smoke Dress” or 
the “Meat Dress” Lady Gaga wore at the 2010 Video Music Awards on the 
other, the challenge the courts face shifts from the assumption that the item is 
useful, and therefore must be examined regarding whether it includes separa-
ble artistic elements, to identifying at what point on the spectrum items move 
from being unoriginal to being artistic, copyrightable works.  At that point, the 
challenge the courts would face would not be much different than the situa-
tion justices faced in Feist.189  The Court had to identify where, on a spectrum 
between a list of names and numbers and a creative work, copyright protec-
tion begins.  Such a shift to a spectrum-based system requires that fashion be 
moved from being understood as part of the “pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural works” section of the law to the more arts-focused sections, which do not 
require an initial assumption that the work is useful and might potentially have 
separable artistic elements.
The courts’ traditional placement of fashion designs within Section 
102 also creates a challenge for works that are not “capable of existing inde-
pendently of” the clothing in which they are incorporated.  This distinction 
bars many fashion designs from copyright protection.190  Additionally, a work 
of visual art cannot include a technical drawing or diagram, which would 
186 Id. § 102(5).
187 Id. § 101.
188 Refinery Smoke, Iris Van Herpen (last visited Mar. 11, 2019), http://www.irisvanherpen.
com/haute-couture/refinery-smoke [https://perma.cc/496U-ZHFC].
189 Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363–64 (1991).
190 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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likely include a fashion design or garment pattern.191  Another challenge fash-
ion designers face is that copyright protection cannot extend to an idea; it can 
only extend to the execution of an idea.192  If a fashion designer created a red, 
floor-length dress, the designer could not sue another designer for copyright 
infringement if that designer also created a red, floor-length dress.  The idea 
of a red, floor-length dress is not novel or original.  The execution of the dress 
can be.  A designer could embellish the dress with embroidery or motifs, use 
innovative fabric, or incorporate a combination of new ideas.  These creative 
decisions are part of the execution of an idea and are, in theory, copyrightable. 
They are, once again, difficult to separate from the functional aspect of the 
piece, such as a gown.
B. Fashion’s Efforts for Separate Protections
In 2012, New York Senator Chuck Schumer introduced the Innovative 
Design Protection Act, which would have amended the copyright code to 
extend protection to fashion designs.193  For the purposes of this legislation, 
“fashion design” was defined as the original elements and overall appearance 
of the article.194  Clothing, undergarments, outerwear, gloves, footwear, hand-
bags, belts, eyeglass frames, and headgear would have been protected under 
this amendment.  The bill defined “substantially identical” as “an article of 
apparel which is so similar in appearance as to be likely mistaken for the pro-
tected design.”195  The bill was assigned to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee 
in 2012 but went no further.  It faced criticism for the ambiguity it would have 
created regarding how designers, lawyers, and courts would define “design sim-
ilarity.”196  The definitions were too ambiguous and threatened to harm smaller 
brands that lack the legal or financial resources to compete with industry 
giants.197  Since then, Congress has not made any substantial efforts toward cre-
ating specific protections for fashion designs.
A part of the challenge that comes with increasing protections for design-
ers is known as the “Piracy Paradox” argument.  The argument states that 
191 Id. § 101(A)(i).
192 Id. § 102(b).
193 Innovative Design Protection Act of 2012, S. 3523, 112th Cong. (2012); see also Innova-
tive Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. (2011); De-
sign Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. (2009); Design Piracy Prohibition 
Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. (2007); Design Piracy Prohibition Act, S. 1957, 110th Cong. 
(2007).
194 S. 3523, 112th Cong. (2012).
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196 Lauren E. Purcell, A Fashion Flop: The Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Pre-
vention Act, 31 J.L. & Com. 207, 221–24 (2013); Ashley Marshall, Free Fashion, 17 Marq. 
Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 123, 140–41 (2013); Casey E. Callahan, Fashion Frustrated: Why 
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designers create clothing that certain individuals purchase to distinguish them-
selves as fashionable people.  Copiers recreate the designs and make them 
accessible to everyone.  This creates a demand from the fashion elites for newer 
styles in order to maintain their fashionable image.198  Essentially, copiers fuel 
the cyclical nature of the fashion industry.  Fast-fashion copies accelerate the 
fashion cycle, which leads to more production and profits for brands.199  As legal 
scholars Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman explained, “[c]opying and 
derivative reworking produce a faster creative cycle and more consumption of 
fashion due to the quicker deterioration of apparel’s status-conferring value.”200
Of course, copying original designs for profit is not new to fashion. 
During the nineteenth century, France, and Paris in particular, established itself 
as the center of modern haute couture.201  Supporters of copyright protection 
for American fashion throughout the twentieth century have noted that “art 
[is] an economic history of the practical French,” and linked Paris’s rise as a 
fashion capital to the Parisian understanding of the connection between the 
economy and industrial design, the belief that products of industrial design can 
be protected as art, and the importance of providing protection for that art.202
By the turn of the century, the big American department stores—Saks 
Fifth Avenue, Bergdorf-Goodman, Neiman Marcus, etc.—were sending scouts 
to the Paris fashion shows to sketch the latest styles.  These designs would then 
be copied and produced as part of the store’s next seasonal collection.  In the 
1920s, women began dressing in a simpler manner, best symbolized by the low-
waisted chemise “flapper” dress.  As fashion became more accessible, it also 
became easier to copy from sketches.203  Today, the advent of “fast fashion”—
or clothing brands like Zara, H&M, and Forever 21 that reproduce the latest 
trends quickly and cheaply—has made piracy a significant issue for luxury 
fashion brands.
The Piracy Paradox argument fails to account for the havoc the acceler-
ated fashion cycle brings to designers.  Beginning in the 1970s, most American 
designers produced and presented collections twice a year, at New York Fash-
ion Week in February and again in September.  In the twenty-first century, 
fashion houses have begun to increase the pace of their design and production 
schedules to meet growing customer demands.  A growing number of luxury 
198 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual 
Property in Fashion Design, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1687, 1775–76 (2006).
199 Id. at 1693–95.
200 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox Revisited, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 
1201, 1207 (2009).
201 Meaghan McGurrin Ehrhard, Protecting the Seasonal Arts: Fashion Design, Copyright 
Law, and the Viability of the Innovative Design Protection & Piracy Prevention Act, 45 
Conn. L. Rev. 285, 290 (2012).
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203 Mary Lynn Stewart, Copying and Copyrighting Haute Couture: Democratizing Fashion, 
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brands today no longer follow the fashion calendar, instead using a see-now, 
buy-now strategy in which clients purchase clothing right off the runway.  Also 
contributing to the increased pace, large conglomerates such as Louis Vuitton 
Moet Hennessey (LVMH) and the Gucci Group have consolidated much of 
the luxury goods market by building portfolios across industries.  As a result, 
brands are more focused than ever before on earnings and profits for share-
holders.204  These factors together lead to increased stress on fashion designers. 
As a result, the average tenure for a creative director at high-end fashion houses 
has grown shorter and shorter.  For instance, a few months before designer 
Oscar de la Renta died in 2014, he had hired his artistic heir apparent, the sea-
soned British designer Peter Copping.  Less than two years later, Copping had 
been dismissed.205  This rate of turnover, in which high-profile designers stay 
with big-name fashion brands for just one or two years before leaving or being 
pushed out, is the norm in today’s competitive fashion and retail environment.
However, profit should not be the only thing considered when analyz-
ing the fashion industry.  The accelerated fashion cycle causes environmental 
stress as well, as more natural resources are used in production each year. 
People also throw away more articles of clothing as they go out of style.  In 
North America, consumers are buying—and getting rid of—five times as many 
items of clothing as they did twenty-five years ago, according to the Huffington 
Post.  Much of that clothing—a whopping 85 percent—will end up in a land-
fill.206  While copying can be beneficial in many respects because it allows for 
collaboration and creativity within the fashion industry, there is clearly a down-
side.  The harmful effects of the accelerated fashion cycle, including designer 
and environmental stress, can be mitigated by increased copyright protection. 
Likewise, in a vulnerable industry, when one company’s collection succeeds, 
others will attempt to capitalize on the trend.  The key legal question is, at what 
point does copying go too far?
VI. The Art-First Interpretation of Fashion Design
The Supreme Court explained at the start of its opinion in Star Athlet-
ica that it agreed to hear Star’s appeal of the Sixth Circuit decision to extend 
copyright protection to athletic-uniform giant Varsity in order to “resolve 
204 Bharat N. Anand, Elizabeth Lea Carpenter & Samhita Patwardhan Jayanti, Os-
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widespread disagreement” regarding the meaning of Section 101 of the Copy-
right Act.207  Section 101, as discussed earlier, requires that artistic elements 
that are incorporated into useful items be separately identifiable from the 
functional aspects of the item.208  While the decision was lauded as a victory 
for the fashion industry, this Article contends that the Court did not achieve its 
objective in clarifying copyright law as it applies to works of fashion.209  Quite 
conversely, the Court’s first decision regarding works of fashion muddied the 
waters regarding the rights of fashion designers to protect their creations. 
Essentially, we can draw from the Court’s decision that the separability test, 
which was developed in 1954 in a case that involved a lamp, only requires 
that the artistic element of a functional item be imaginable as appearing on 
another, nonfunctional form of media, such as a painter’s canvas.  Furthermore, 
it is not required that the item remain functional when the artistic elements 
are removed, as the dissent contended.210  Such a restatement of the sepa-
rability test provides that nearly any artistic aspect of a functional item can 
receive copyright protection.  More important, however, than the questions 
that the decision raised regarding the practical applicability of the separability 
test to fashion designs were justices’ assumptions regarding the very nature of 
such creations.
The Court framed the question before it as a matter of clarifying the sep-
arability test.  Such a choice of frames carried with it a mass of assumptions 
that substantively channeled the Court’s thinking.  Crucially, the Court auto-
matically placed works of fashion into the “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works” category, which essentially married such designs to the artistic-useful 
dichotomy that directed the Court’s thinking in Mazer.  Such a designation 
also linked fashion designs with the provisions regarding useful items in Sec-
tion 113.211  Relatedly, the decision dealt with the case from the outset as a 
matter of separability regarding the artistic aspects of a functional item.  The 
Court thus communicated a fundamentally limited conceptualization of the 
nature of fashion design as something more comparable to manufacturing car 
207 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007.
208  17 U.S.C. § 101.
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engines than to works such as the Mondrian dress, which incorporate art into 
the design of a potentially useful item.
This Article contends that the longstanding confusion regarding copy-
right protections for works of fashion can only be resolved by conceptualizing 
them as a form of art that is often applied to useful objects, an understanding 
that is more associated with Section 106 of the Copyright Act, which allows 
copyright holders to control how their works are used, including extending the 
right of creating derivative works.212  Such an understanding is substantially 
similar to Justice Ginsburg’s conclusion in her concurring opinion.  She found 
that the cheerleading uniform designs were registered as two-dimensional 
drawings that were later applied to functional items, and thus there was no 
need for the separability test.213  Section 113 provides that a copyright holder, 
as is outlined more generally in Section 106, has the right to reproduce the 
copyrighted “work in or on any kind of article, whether useful or otherwise.”214 
Thus, if fashion designs are first and foremost understood as artistic creations 
that can be applied to useful items, the traditional criteria for copyright protec-
tion, such as originality or application to a tangible form of media, then apply.
Indeed, many modern works of fashion make little or no claim to be 
functional items.  Perhaps the most famous example was Lady Gaga’s “Meat 
Dress,” which was composed of about forty pounds of raw meat affixed to a 
corset.  It was intended to register shock, even outrage.  Certainly, such gar-
ments can be worn, but the baseline of functionality that individuals associate 
with clothing, such as covering the body and providing protection from the ele-
ments, is not always achieved.  In many cases, a person cannot wear such items 
to work or school, for example.  In these instances, fashion designs are most 
classifiable as art that can be worn, much as if a painter created a series of orig-
inal paintings on canvases and, rather than initially hanging them on a gallery 
wall, first had several people carry them around the streets.  Many fashion cre-
ations are similar to such canvases, except they are worn rather than carried.
The art-first approach to fashion design does not claim that all clothing 
items are copyrightable.  The definitions provided within Section 101 of the 
Copyright Act remain crucial.  Section 101 defines a useful item as “an arti-
cle having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the 
appearance of the article or to convey information.”215  Thus, the challenge 
of the art-first approach to copyright protection for fashion designs is clarify-
ing where copyright protection should begin on the spectrum between purely 
useful items, such as a plain white T-shirt, and the mostly artistic, such as the 
“Meat Dress.”  As indicated earlier, such a challenge is not terribly different 
than the concerns the courts consider in copyright cases that involve music or 
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photography.  A part of their evaluation must include considering whether the 
original work was indeed original enough to receive protection.  In Feist Pub-
lications v. Rural Telephone Service, the Supreme Court concluded that simply 
taking a series of phone numbers and addresses from one phonebook and plac-
ing them into another phonebook was not a copyright violation.216  The phone 
listings lacked even a minimal amount of originality.  Similarly, a clothing pro-
ducer could not claim copyright protection over a white T-shirt.  The creation 
lacks the originality element.
For this reason and others, the art-first approach avoids traditional con-
cerns regarding granting design monopolies to certain clothing companies.  As 
with questions regarding originality, the courts have dealt with such concerns 
regarding artistic works for centuries.  In Time v. Bernard Geis in 1968, a federal 
district court ruled that a book publisher that used Time’s copyright-protected 
footage of the Kennedy assassination to create sketches for a new book could 
qualify as a fair use.217  The court found that the work, since it posed no true 
competition to the copyright holder, would, if anything, “enhance the value 
of the copyrighted work.218  Similarly, in Alexander v. Haley, a federal district 
court found that the author of Roots could not successfully claim that another 
author, who wrote a similarly themed work titled Jubilee, violated copyright.219 
Thus, recognizing fashion designers’ works as artistic rather than functional 
does not create any new problems in copyright law.
In many cases, the courts have ruled that commentaries, parodies, and 
other recreations of original items can be understood as fair uses and are 
therefore protected from findings of copyright violation.  Furthermore, the 
precedential history of “aesthetic functionality” provides a relatively clear line 
for the courts regarding when a designer can claim protection for a certain cre-
ation.  The courts allowed a fashion designer to protect a certain color on the 
soles of the shoes he designed and a dry-cleaning company supplier to secure 
exclusive rights to the color it used on its pads.220  In each of these cases, the 
courts reasoned essentially that the provision of such protection did not sub-
stantially damage competition.  The same can be said for the art-first approach. 
Similarly, it is possible to protect artistic creations made by fashion design-
ers without harming the marketplace.  If a designer creates an original work, 
the designer can claim protection for that work.  Such reasoning overlaps 
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significantly with the conclusions put forth in Mazer, which has cast an outsized 
shadow on copyright law for more than sixty years.  In extending copyright 
protections to the lamp designs, Justice Reed wrote that such rights come from 
a “conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the 
best way to advance public welfare . . . .  Sacrificial days devoted to such cre-
ative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.”221
Ultimately, the art-first approach to copyright protections for fashion 
designers lacks the catchiness of the “separability test” or the step-by-step pro-
cess that is often associated with tests from the courts.  This is for good reason. 
The art-first approach seeks to simplify copyright law by reclassifying fash-
ion designs as artistic elements that are often applied to useful items.  Such a 
reclassification more accurately accounts for modern fashion creations, more 
naturally aligns with existing copyright law, and neatly flows with existing prec-
edents regarding the copyrightability of artists’ works.
221 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.

